



The term Europe has not always been understood in the same way. Depending on the period and influenced by the dominant interpreting elites at the time, it was always different features that were emphasised, ›new‹ traditions that were discovered and ›created‹, and different values – specific to the period – that were claimed as European. Europe is a construct. That is as true today as in the period before 1945.

This monograph focuses on ›Sachbücher‹ (nonfiction books), travelogues and literary-political writings by eight authors who played a key role in the discourse on Europe in the Third Reich and also partly in the early German Federal Republic. One of them is Walter Kiaulehn. In World War II, in the periodical *Signal*, Kiaulehn draws up a European ›family tree‹ of a somewhat different, totalitarian kind – naturally excluding semi-Asiatic Russia as well as England, ›a refugee from Europe‹. England has ›swum off‹ in the direction of the USA. For Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, Great Britain and France belong to the ›margins of Europe‹ anyway, while the central powers, Germany and Italy, constitute the actual core of the continent. Europe evolves from the centre, and it is characteristically medial, balanced, mediating between tradition and progress. It is the others who are radical and have no appreciation for the middle course: the Americans with their skyscraper fantasies and the Bolsheviks with their anti-cultural tabularasa mentality. ›The New Europe‹, on the other hand, is the continent where in accordance with a golden mean that has developed historically, a moderate Modernism takes shape. An instance of this is the ›New Bari‹, the ›favorite city of Fascism‹ that Gustav R. Hocke visits in 1937 and in which, instead of giant high-rises, he encounters much smaller, six-storey buildings along the new waterfront promenade.

The term ›The New Europe‹ became generally accepted in Germany during the 1930s, and by the beginning of World War II it was an integral part of the German discourse on Europe.

Last but not least, this book would like to encourage the reader to critically question the provisionally last ›great narrative‹ of the Occident – the narrative according to which Europe evolved from liberal humanist traditions and, based on democratic values, gradually came to have its present form in several intermediate stages beginning in classical antiquity.

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**Carl Wege**

# »Das Neue Europa« 1933–1945

## German Thought Patterns about Europe



**Carl Wege** »Das Neue Europa« 1933–1945

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Carl Wege

**»Das Neue Europa«  
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**Edition Axel Menges**

»From whatever direction you approach Germany, the impressions become more and more imposing, while they become weaker and more doubtful the farther you travel away from there [...]; Germany is the core [...]. The German spirit will emerge from this battle of giants [i.e., the battle among European nations] stronger than ever. The new Europe is already in sight.«  
Johannes V. Jensen

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## About this book

The term »Das Neue Europa« began to catch on in Germany in the 1930s, and by the beginning of World War Two had become an integral part of the German European discourse.

The focus of the present monograph is »non-fiction books«, travelogues and literary-political writings by eight authors who made a significant contribution to the discourse about Europe and what it meant to be European during the Third Reich and partly in the early German Federal Republic as well.

One of them is Walther Kiaulehn. During World War Two, in the periodical *Signal*, Kiaulehn draws up a European »family tree« of a somewhat different, totalitarian kind – naturally to the exclusion of a semi-Asiatic Russia and of England, which has »fled from Europe«. England has »floated away« towards the United States. For Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, Great Britain, like France, is part of »the margins of Europe«, while on the other hand the central powers Germany and Italy are part of the actual *core* of the continent. Europe arises from the centre, and Europeaness is characterised by what is medial, balanced, what mediates between tradition and progress. It is the others who are radical and without any sense for what lies in the middle: the Americans with their fantasies of skyscrapers and the Bolsheviks with their culture-phobic tabula rasa mentality. The »New Europe«, on the other hand, is the continent in which, in line with a moderation that has evolved historically, a centrist, *moderate* modernity is taking shape – for instance, in the »New Bari«, the »favourite city of Fascism«, which Gustav R. Hocke visits in 1937, and where, instead of gigantic high-rises, he encounters much smaller, six-storey buildings along the newly constructed seaside promenade (»no repetition of Americanism in Italy«).

Later, after the war, in the new version of Hocke's book about Italy (1960), there is no longer any mention of the »New Bari« as the »favourite city of Fascism«. Other authors, too, were to »rework« their books and positions. Among them was Friedrich Sieburg, who after 1945 becomes one of the most influential literary critics in West Germany. In 1941 Sieburg, who intermittently lived in France, had given a lecture in occupied Paris in which he bewails the lack of »public spirit« of the French and at the same time sharply criticises their excessive penchant for privacy and individualism. After 1945 he was to regard the *Grande Nation* from a new perspective and extol France as the »motherland of individualism«.

The »European values« Sieburg had written about had changed. They are subject to changing times – and political systems – and, embedded in changing contexts, now have a different dimension of meaning. When, for instance, an article from 1943 says that »Turkey« is ready to »carry European values deeper into the Orient« (Harald Laeuen, in the present book, p. 62), the values referred to were definitely not the same as those in a 1990s text that speaks of Anatolia as a »value bridge to Central Asia«.

European values are not timeless values. They do not exist beyond time and *space*. Also, the space to which they are related changes *with time*. It would probably not have occurred to a representative of Christian churches in the 1950s, just as it would never occur to a present-day human rights activist, to regard Turkey as part of the European community of values – and certainly not as a country that is predestined to pass on the values of Europe to Central Asia. The notion is absurd – but *not at all times*.

## »Does Europe exist?« Or is Europe conjured up in the discourse about Europe?

»If there is a power which it is our mission to destroy, and to destroy by all available means, it is the West and the class of Germans that were swamped by its foreign influences. They say ›German‹ and throng into their motherland Europe.«<sup>1</sup>

Ernst von Salomon, in his novel *Die Geächteten* (The Outlaws), puts the above words into the mouth of former Lieutenant Erwin Kern, who, on 24 June 1922, together with two »comrades« murdered the German Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau. Salomon is involved in the preparations for Rathenau's assassination and serves a sentence in prison between 1922 and 1928. The novel, which has autobiographical elements, was first published in 1930.

From the perspective of the »national revolutionaries« around Ernst von Salomon, the Jew and »European« Walther Rathenau was the »ripest fruit«<sup>2</sup> of the class that was »impacted by the foreign influences of the West«. No sooner had he taken up his duties as foreign minister in February 1922 than he travelled to the Mediterranean to take part in an international conference in Genoa, and Erwin Kern comments on the event as follows:

»Are the men who now travel so earnestly and busily to Genoa able to contribute a substance of their own? They speak the language of the adversary, they think in his terms. [...] Time and again it has been their great ambition to be integrated in the system of the major powers of Europe, of the West.«<sup>3</sup>

Walther Rathenau and other representatives of a Weimar Republic that is »in bondage to Europe« listen to the voice of the victorious Western powers. They are traitors. Instead of Germany and the German fatherland their allegiance is to their »motherland Europe«. The national revolutionaries regard Germany and Europe as opposites and »hostile powers«. Europe is »the others« – beyond the Rhine, Meuse and Moselle.

In the novel *The Outlaws*, Rathenau is depicted as a man without a »substance of his own«. That which is his own, his native land, the land where he was born, has become alien to him, and in the process of this alienation he becomes a European »without substance« who, instead of being »rooted« in his native land, thinks in supranational ideas and »terms«.

In 1916 Georg Simmel speaks of the »deep-rooted national character« on the one hand and »Europeanness« as an »idea« on the other.<sup>4</sup> In this case, too, »Germaness« and »Europeanness« seem to be mutually exclusive. Yet this time the situation is different. For Simmel continues:

»It [Europeanness, C.W.] is not situated among the nations, but rather beyond them, and can therefore be readily associated with any individual national life.«<sup>5</sup>

The thought seems familiar to us today. After 1945 it will become current again. In the days of World War One and the return to the concept of all things national, on the other hand, it sounds strangely anachronistic – like a relic of a long-ago pro-European era. Georg Simmel, too, is aware of this. At the height of the war he admits that »the intellectual entity we called ›Europe‹ has been shattered« and that its »reconstruction is not foreseeable«.<sup>6</sup> Others agree with his diagnosis. Thus Hugo von Hofmannsthal wonders, in reference to the great European war, whether »Europe, the word taken as an intellectual term, has ceased to exist«.<sup>7</sup> And Robert Musil describes the »mood« shortly before the outbreak of war as follows:

»It was implicitly considered impossible that the great nations, ever more closely united by a European culture, could today still get carried away and go to war with each other.«<sup>8</sup>

However, something that as early as the 19th century appeared to take the shape of a joint »project of the European spirit«, which emphasised the affinity between the national intellectual giants (the German Gerhart Hauptmann and the Norwegian Ibsen etc.), was destroyed in the battles of World War One and seemed to be irretrievably lost. Musil, who in years to come will perhaps be celebrated as one of the »first Europeans«, regarded himself as »the last European«.<sup>9</sup> In 1914 Europe had ceased to exist; instead, wrote Musil, the continent was »cleft« into »German and anti-German«.<sup>10</sup>

Like a share in the stock market, the market value of Europe has constantly been rising and falling during the course of the 20th century. Slumps follow booms. The period before 1914 can be considered a boom. At least this is true of the dissemination of the »European idea« in *segments* of Central European elites and intellectual circles. What followed then was a severe crisis of this idea, which affected the representatives of the »European spirit« on the other side of the Rhine as well. Among others, three essays written by the French author Paul Valéry in 1919 – published in German translation in 1930/31 under the title of *Die Krise des Geistes* – bear eloquent witness to this. In these essays, Valéry describes both the greatness of Europe and the imminent loss of its importance, and asks himself:

»Will Europe assert its pre-eminence in all fields of endeavour?//Will Europe become *what it is in reality*: a small promontory of the Asian continent?//Or will Europe remain *what it seemingly is*: the most precious part of our Earth, the crown of our planet, the brain of a vast body?«<sup>11</sup>

Europe, as the measure of all things, sets intellectual standards that are in reverse proportion to the geographical dimensions of the continent. Valéry is obsessed by this discrepancy between intellectual »greatness« and geographical insignificance. Valéry wonders whether Europe can maintain its status as an »intellectual power« of the first magnitude, or whether from now on it is to play a subordinate role, one that reflects its minimal geographical significance.

Among Valéry's readers in Germany in the 1930s are a large number of proven authorities on France, including the writer Friedrich Sieburg and the Romance philologist Max Clauss. Both of them interpreted or »reinterpreted« Valéry's reflections on Europe in a remarkable way.

For instance, Friedrich Sieburg, in the preface of his book *Afrikanischer Frühling*, published in 1938 following his journey through North and West Africa, writes:

»[...] seen from Africa, Europe suddenly assumes a stunning reality. The claim of a French aesthete that Europe is only a promontory of Asia had never seemed as invalid to me as it did during this journey, which, by constant comparison, really revealed to me what I should like to call the geniality of Europe.«<sup>12</sup>

In 1919 or, respectively, in 1930/31, Valéry speaks of Europe as the »most precious part of the Earth«, the »crown« and the »brain« of our planet, and Sieburg in 1938 refers to »Europe's geniality«. The characterisations resemble each other, and their similarities in terms of content are evident. And yet Sieburg totally disagrees with Paul Valéry – he emphasises their differences and opposes the *pessimism* of the »French aesthete«. For him, in 1938, Valéry's essays read like a premature obituary for the old continent. As Sieburg saw it, this continent had in the meantime, in spite of all »visions of doom«, completely »recovered«, »renewed« and »regenerated« itself. The Occident had not declined, and Europe did not sink into insignificance, but rose again as the so-called *New Europe* under totalitarian rule.

Like Friedrich Sieburg, the Romance philologist and later foreign affairs editor of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* Max Clauss found Valéry's fear that Europe was possibly »atrophying« into an insignificant promontory of Asia to be »defeatist« and utterly inappropriate. His book *Tatsache Europa* was published in 1943, at the height of the »Russia campaign«. At the very beginning are the following words, directed against Paul Valéry:

»Gone was the literary West's witty and totally resigned idea of the little headland of civilisation before a vast barbaric eastern expanse.«<sup>13</sup>

Apart from the fact that the author is alluding to Valéry here, though without coming even close to his ideas, this statement is directed equally against the »literary West« and the »barbaric East«. It is directed not only against »Asiatic« bolshevism but also against the »old« France, a country for which Clauss had once, when he was still writing articles on »European reconciliation«, felt a great deal of sympathy.<sup>14</sup> But times change and with them the idea of France and Europe. In 1943 Clauss wrote:

»While between the two wars a [...] supposed concept of security [i.e., the need for security felt by »the« French, C.W.] wanted to have Europe end at the Maginot Line, the defence wall of our culture was now boldly and consistently carried forward to the boundaries of the steppe. As a result, in truth, our continent arose anew – complete for the first time.«<sup>15</sup>

Europe grows beyond its boundaries and »reinvents itself«. Its value is enhanced and *reassessed*; and, recharged with new values, it succeeds in attaining »new greatness«. In 1943, *Europe* is no longer a French term for a vanished world.

Like the old Europe, the Pan-Europa of Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi also »dies« during the National Socialist period. From the very outset, there had been insinuations in nationalist circles that the Pan-European project served only to incorporate Germany into the West in order to »prevent« a »reinvigoration« of the country.<sup>16</sup> In his 1943 book, Max Clauss calls Pan-Europa a »will-o'-the-wisp«. <sup>17</sup> An imaginary light, it haunts Europe for a short moment, manages to blind a few contemporaries and then, without leaving any traces, vanishes once more in the Hades of the history of ideas. It is extinguished, and Europe appears in a new light – in the »light« of totalitarian systems.

Pan-Europa leaves no vacuum behind it. Rather, since the end of the 1930s, the discursive field that is »Europe« has been gradually given new content. Max Clauss speaks of World War Two as the »last intra-European war«, and the editor of the *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Franz Alfred Six, speaks of a »war of unification«. <sup>18</sup> From a »German« perspective it is a war conducted against the »non-European« powers »America«, »England«<sup>19</sup> and »Russia«, in the course of which, according to Clauss, the »continent arises new and complete for the first time« (see above).

Like Max Clauss, Friedrich Sieburg too has arrived in the »New Europe« during the 1930s, and hopes that in the not too distant future, »inflexible« France, which insists on maintaining the status quo, will also »grow into« the newly emerging order. Sieburg, who had already begun writing in the Weimar Republic, follows and understands the reassessment of the idea of Europe and the transition from the old to the new Europe in person, as it were. Since 1926 he has been working as a foreign correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in Paris, and when in 1929 French foreign minister Aristide Briand brings his plan to form a loose union of the European states to public attention, he comments on this plan in detail in several articles.<sup>20</sup> And although he views Briand's plan with a great

deal of scepticism, Sieburg regards the French foreign minister as a »great European« and a politician of European format. When, on 3 October 1929, Briand's »colleague«, German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, dies, he describes the two politicians as two statesmen »who together worked on the restoration and resurgence of Europe«. <sup>21</sup>

Sieburg's biographer, Cecilia von Buddenbrock, writes, no doubt in reference to the Pan-Europa movement as well, that Briand's plan of a European union was one that »was in the air in the 'twenties«. <sup>22</sup> But what was also in the air, and more than ever, were anti-European ideas that were directed against Western trends, particularly in Germany and particularly in nationalist circles. One year after Briand brought his plan for Europe to public attention, Salomon's novel *Die Geächteten* is published. Briand's plan and Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa movement had only minimal support in the 1920s.<sup>23</sup>

Aristide Briand dies three years after Stresemann, in March 1932, and in the ensuing period the German-French dialogue »shrinks«, according to Sieburg, »to a French monologue«. <sup>24</sup> Conversely one might just as well have said that the dialogue had shrunk to a German monologue. With the rise of National Socialism the tone – including Sieburg's tone – towards the neighbouring country becomes more implacable and »demanding«. In his book *Es werde Deutschland* Sieburg demands that France and the French stop »dawdling«, and urges that they should finally enter a »changing world«. <sup>25</sup> His article with the significant title »Frankreich im neuen Europa« (»France in the new Europe«) appears in 1938. In this article Sieburg lists what France now needs in his opinion. He quotes Georges Bonnet, one of Briand's successors as foreign minister, who used the words »strength and discipline«, and he adds: »[...] in short, we [i.e., we Germans, C.W.] expect a great deal from the beginning change, for we need in Europe a clear, strong and stable France.« <sup>26</sup> As yet, it was not the République française, but Friedrich Sieburg who was on the path to a »New Europe«.

»By nature, it [i.e., Europe, C.W.] looks westward«, and »in the south it borders on a glorious sea [...]«, writes Paul Valéry in one of his essays<sup>27</sup> – admittedly the border towards the glorious sea was open. Valéry regards the entire »eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea« as a coherent (historical) space, which he calls »pre-Europe«. <sup>28</sup> He considers the cities of »Smyrna [Turk. Izmir, C.W.] and Alexandria« to be European cities.<sup>29</sup> The term »pre-Europe« was »confusing« and was bound to lead to misunderstandings. Obviously Valéry, who, eliminating intermediate zones, thought exclusively in the categories »Europe« and »Asia«, had difficulties finding a suitable term.

The Mediterranean Sea did not set boundaries between the continents, but connected them with each other, and the historian Herfried Münkler consistently speaks of the »ancient civilisation« as a »civilisation connected by the sea«. <sup>30</sup> It was not until the early Middle Ages that the open boundary became less permeable. »As a result of the Arab-Islamic advance at the end of the 8th century CE« the Mediterranean Sea is »blocked off«, resulting in a mainland continent named Europe turned in upon itself on the north side of the post-classical world.<sup>31</sup> Münkler writes:

»Europe [meaning medieval Europe, C.W.] is initially determined not by the sea but by the land: the sea is perceived not as a medium but as a boundary. In classical antiquity, a man attains his identity as a seafarer; a European, on the other hand, is first and foremost a landlubber.«<sup>32</sup>

Münkler works out the contrast between the open (Mediterranean) *sea* world of antiquity that ignored and transcended continental boundaries and the continental *mainland* of Europe, which is to a large extent isolated from the rest of the world.

Back to Valéry. While Valéry primarily thinks in terms of the categories »Asian landmass« and »spiritual and intellectual Europe«, another great cultural critic and contemporary of Valéry, the »morphologist« Oswald Spengler, categorically refuses to even consider using the two continent names Europe and Asia. He thinks they make no sense. At the very beginning of his book *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (The Decline of the Occident) he explains why he considers the term »Europe« misleading:

»[...] Historians are also subject to the fatal prejudice of geography (not to say the suggestive power of a map) that assumes there is a *continent* of Europe, whereupon they feel obliged also to draw a corresponding non-material distinction against »Asia«. The word Europe should be deleted from history. There is no such thing as a »European« as a historical type. It is absurd in the case of the Hellenes to speak of »European antiquity« (so Homer, Heraclitus, Pythagoras were »Asians«?) and of their »mission« to bring Asia and Europe closer culturally. [...] Orient and Occident are terms of genuine historical substance. »Europe« is a hollow word. All the great creations produced by antiquity came about thanks to the negation of any continental border between Rome and Cyprus, Byzantium and Alexandria.«<sup>33</sup>

The sentence in parentheses, »So Homer, Heraclitus, Pythagoras were »Asians«?« requires clarification. With this sentence Spengler alludes to the fact that the ancient Greek world comprised not only the western, »European« part but also the eastern, »Asiatic« part of the Aegean. It comprised the *entire* Aegean Sea and did not allow itself to be divided into a world on this side and beyond the Hellespont (today called the Dardanelles). Smyrna was located on the other side of the Hellespont in what was later called »Asia Minor« and to this day is the first to be named as the possible birthplace of Homer. From a purely *geographical* point of view, the poet of the Odyssey should thus be called an »Asian«.

Like Valéry, Spengler too believes the cities of Smyrna<sup>34</sup> and Alexandria, situated in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, are two cities closely connected with »Hellenism«, but he refrains from calling them »European«. Spengler liberates history from the dictate of geography and the »suggestive power of the map«. From a cultural-historical point of view Smyrna was located neither in Europe nor in Asia. On the basis of *geographical* categories and conventions it was impossible to classify where it belonged culturally.

The idea of calling Homer, who was born in Asia Minor, an »Asian« seems absurd; on the other hand including modern-day Turkey in Europe seems perfectly worth considering. Calling a person or a people such as the Russians »Asiatic« was apt to provoke negative emotions until long into the 20th century, and was deliberately used as a means of defamation by the National Socialists. On the other hand, regarding a country like Turkey as European is akin to »ennoblement«, from the point of view of »core Europe«.

Admittedly, for a country to »belong«, certain conditions and criteria must be met. The country does not have to be situated in Europe in a strictly geographical sense, but it must have gone through a process of Europeanisation. Turkey gradually went through this process starting in 1924 as part of the reforms introduced by Kemal Atatürk. Later, in the 1930s, it was given to understand by the Third Reich that it was welcome in the »New Europe«. <sup>35</sup> But it was not only the proc-

ess of Europeanisation that made Turkey into a European nation; more importantly, the country also met important political and strategic military »admission criteria« of totalitarian Europe. Firstly, the Turkish republic was governed by a »modern« *autocratic* regime that was also wooed by the Third Reich, not least because it was an outpost on the way to the Caucasus and into the eastern Mediterranean region.

An additional criterion that Turkey was *never* able to meet is hardly an issue any more during the Nazi era. In the 1930s the discourse about what is European is decoupled from its »Occidental-Christian« components, and the criterion of belonging to »Christendom« no longer applies. As a result of the return to traditional European narratives, however, this criterion then experiences an extraordinary renaissance in the conservative circles of West Germany after 1945 and serves as a rationale, as it already did earlier, in the 19th century, for why Turkey is incompatible with Europe.

There have always been »good reasons« for excluding a country from Europe, or reasons for including it. As a rule, what is meant by Europe remains unclear for the most part. And European values, which have been repeatedly reassessed in the course of the 20th century, are also not particularly clear – or are they? For at any rate it is clear that they are constantly being redefined depending on how they are interpreted. Before 1945, they are understood, particularly from the German perspective, to be authoritarian values, while after 1945 they are understood to be democratic values. At the same time Europe's borders are constantly being redrawn, and now run along the *value borders* of a continent that is no longer as exactly defined geographically.

Europe is wherever its values are in force, and thus tends to be everywhere.<sup>36</sup> This idea gains new momentum with the founding of the EEC and more than ever under the European Union. Thus, the writer Jorge Semprún proclaims: »Europe's only frontier is democracy.«<sup>37</sup> And, in his lecture »Das offene Europa«, on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, Lord Ralf Dahrendorf wishes for »[...] a European Union that is open to all those who meet its criteria and that, as a matter of principle, sets no demarcation lines.«<sup>38</sup>

With the spread of European-type democracy the world is Europeanised and gradually becomes »compatible«. <sup>39</sup> Europe is henceforth everywhere, or, one could say conversely: nowhere anymore. It loses its contours, once thought to be clear-cut, in the global process of Europeanisation. This process, with all its various aspects and facets, has always been part of the Europe discourse.

The writer Egon Vietta, in 1948, speaks of the »global expansion of European space« and means by this primarily the incursion of Occidental rationality into non-European cultural regions.<sup>40</sup>

He writes: »Where reason reigns and science replaces metaphysics, there is the Occident [...].«<sup>41</sup>

And he continues: »The discovery of human reason opened [...] Europe [...] out into the world. Ever since, Europe has been domiciled wherever the laws of science and reason have invalidated the original religious system.«<sup>42</sup>

In the Eurocentric manner of bygone days, Vietta regards reason and rationality as *genuinely* European and Occidental. It does not occur to him that in other circumstances in other cultures other forms of rationality were produced. But that is not what matters. What matters is that Vietta recognises Occidental rationality or, respectively, »the discovery of human reason« by Europeans as a discovery of *universal* significance.<sup>43</sup> Europe is now present wherever its »laws of reason« are in effect.

Europe and all things European expand and grow into non-European cultures – this idea was virulent in the National Socialist period as well. In a lecture to the French »Groupe Collaboration« in 1941, the Austrian writer Colin Ross speaks of »l'poque de »l'europsation« de la terre.«<sup>44</sup> Admittedly, by »la terre« he does not mean the entire planet but only the »civilisable« and »cultivable« part of the world and thus certainly not the »East«, which begins somewhere beyond the Vistula and the Neman rivers. Ross draws boundaries and regards the »steppe« as the antithesis and counterfoil of Europe. He makes a distinction between »l'Europe propre« and »l'Asie propre«, two continents between which spreads, as a kind of sixth or even seventh continent, »le continent des steppes eurasiatiques«.<sup>45</sup> This continent, since time immemorial, has embodied that which is anti-European – it is from here that wild hordes have always set out in order to invade »l'Europe propre«. Intermittently they even succeeded in gaining control of large parts of the continent. Colin Ross refers to the Huns and Mongols, and adds that there were periods during which Europe ceased to exist: »l'Europe n'existait pas.«<sup>46</sup> »Les continents«, according to Ross, »variant [...] ils naissent et ils disparaissent.«<sup>47</sup> But Europe never disappeared completely, or rather always awoke to new life again. It recovered from the Mongol storm – and the expansion of Bolshevism – and the tide turned. And it was not »l'Europe propre«, but »le continent des steppes eurasiatiques« that was in danger of »disappearing« since the Wehrmacht invasion of the Soviet Union.

In Colin Ross' 1941 lecture, the continents are set in motion. To be sure, Ross still thinks in solid entities, yet these entities are no longer geographically defined, but are of a »spiritual« and »racial« nature. The Urals, in this way of thinking, are no longer a boundary; instead, the boundary is now between the »race blanche« and the inhabitants of the steppe.

The constant and persistent attempts to define Europe and things European by drawing borders and opening borders will be described and evaluated below, summarised under five aspects.

1. Every time borders are drawn or opened and Europe is geographically defined, an ideological statement is made. There is no such thing as an objective, neutral description of what is European, or, to use the words of Herfried Mnkler: »[...] it is impossible to develop a descriptive concept of Europe – always and a priori there are normative factors inherent in the concept.«<sup>48</sup>

2. Any definition, by definition, codifies instead of keeping the horizon of description open or opening it in the first place. This procedure of codification is not suitable for getting closer to Europe and the essence of what is European. Instead it is necessary to reflect the perspectives which change depending on the viewpoint of the observer – together with their nation-specific implications – perspectives that have been incorporated in the respective description of Europe and of what is European. *It is the observer who decides* what is meant by Europe. As a rule the observer follows an interpretation that is in circulation in his epoch and his nation, or takes part in developing this interpretation because of his influential position.

3. In the attempt to define Europe and what is European, *essentialistic* and *constructivist* notions compete with each other. While essentialism understands ways of being European as »given«, constructivism »denies that an unequivocal, long-term, stable identification of what is European is possible.«<sup>49</sup> With regard to the geography of the European region this means that essentialism regards the Urals as the »hard« and »given« eastern frontier of Europe, while constructivism understands the bordering of the European area by the Urals to be »a convention

of the 18th century«, »intended, not least, to substantiate Russia's claim that it was one of the European great powers«.<sup>50</sup>

4. The constructs of what is European change in accordance with the exclusion and inclusion narratives on which they are based. During the National Socialist period, by excluding Russia, which was assigned to Asia, and England, which was assigned to the Seven Seas, there developed the narrative of a continental core Europe. In its *centre* and *middle* were located the Axis powers Germany and Italy, and around its axis, like satellites, circled the rest of the countries of Continental Europe.

5. The essentialistic approach, particularly because it assumes there is a solid essential core of Europeanness, tends to be conservative and inflexible. Exclusion and inclusion narratives are perpetuated and codified permanently. A region, once excluded from the Christian Occident, also continues to be excluded from Europe. Europe does not change, nor certainly do its borders. They are not redrawn.

During the National Socialist period, too, essentialistic and constructivist approaches compete with each other. On the one hand there are authors who like Giselher Wirsing consider the modern Turkey of Kemal Atatrk or the Russian Empire – not in the present, but in the time of Peter the Great – to be part of Europe, and on the other hand there are Aryan-»inspired« ideologues who like Franz Alfred Six categorically exclude both nations from Europe. Wirsing thinks primarily in political, while Six mainly thinks in »racial« and racist categories. Six describes European culture as a culture shaped by the »Germanic-Romanic family of peoples« and emphasises the »cohesion« and seclusion of a continent »girt by three seas«, which has been mostly spared »invasion by alien races«.<sup>51</sup> Wirsing, on the other hand, tries to accustom his readers to the idea that Europe, although it grew historically, is constantly changing.

Europe is bounded not only in one direction, namely toward the outside, but always also toward the »inside«, vis--vis another, not quite »adequate« Europe of the periphery. And this is by no means a new phenomenon. As early as in the 1930s a distinction was made between a core Europe, that is to say, a European core and centre, and a somewhat marginal Europe. In 1939 Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann assigns the Western European nations of seafarers – Great Britain and France – to the margin and the periphery, while he assigns the successor states of the Roman Empire – Germany and Italy – to the core (see p. 35). The historian Kurt Hancke coins a new term and speaks of the Western European marginal countries« »flight from *Europe*«, and he describes this flight as a *centrifugal* movement »away from the centre and substance of the Occident« toward the Atlantic and the later overseas colonies.<sup>52</sup> Germany and Italy set standards both for what is European and for what is »normal« and »normally European«. England and France, on the other hand, are considered to be »deviants« from the European norm. From the perspective of Kurt Hancke and Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, it is not Germany that embarks on a »special path«, but the Western European countries.

After 1945 the arguments are reversed and the concept of a »*German* special path« is created. One of the critics of this line of argument, the historian Reinhart Koselleck, turns *in general* against thinking in terms of special paths and notes: »[...] French history [is] a special path measured in terms of British history, Russian history a special path measured in terms of Polish history, the history of Mecklenburg a special path measured in terms of that of Prussia, and so on and so forth.«<sup>53</sup> Those who speak of a special path presuppose that there is a normal

path. This path, however – and this is crucial for teleological theory development and deterministic ways of thinking, is construed a posteriori.

Both in political discourse and in the discourse of the interpreting elites, when an attempt is made to define Europe, the process will be similar: What is meant by Europe and by Europeanness is »determined« *in retrospect*. And depending on interests, and guided by contemporary interpretation patterns, Europe is thus constantly being reinvented from nation- and period-specific points of view. »Europe is a [...] construction, dependent on the interests of the constructors«,<sup>54</sup> and it is in the interest of its constructors to make it appear clear and consistent that historical trends almost inevitably led to a Europe of dictatorships or, respectively, to a Europe of democracies. The status quo attained in the successful battle against whatever the other side happens to be is interpreted as a temporary end- and high-point of development to date, and »the past«, »European identity«, »the essence of Europe« etc. is seen in the light of a »great European narrative«. According to this great European narrative, which is rewritten from time to time, the history of Europe reached its goal with the *unification* of Europe in the »war of unification« of 1939 or, respectively, after 1945 with the founding of the EEC and the European Union on the basis of mutual fundamental values (understood differently depending on the period).

In present-day historical sciences, during the late 20th and the beginning 21st century, two basic directions and approaches can be distinguished as regards constructs of Europe: (1) on the one hand, scholars note a common »cultural heritage« characterised by humanism paralleling the European process of integration and (2) on the other hand, or rather, by the other side, this same common cultural heritage as well as the European community of values are called into question. There are concerns whether in the course of the European process of integration there has not been an attempt to define a European canon of values in line with political goals, and a historian like Michael Mitterauer is compelled to ask whether the historical sciences are not being »politically co-opted again«.<sup>55</sup>

If one follows teleological and deterministic lines of argumentation, then, gradually and step by step, a movement guided by democratic ideas has emerged in Europe that can also be regarded as the »mainstream« of European history. To be sure, opposing tendencies have not gone unnoticed; however, against the background of a liberal democratic mainstream they appear to be aberrations and deviations, and thus ultimately negligible. In this model of history, »Europe« resembles a matrix in which the values that are dominant in the 21st century were already inscribed *at an early stage*. Among other things, arguments run as follows:

»To describe it [modern and contemporary history, C.W.] in its genesis means being committed to the standards and values of the past – it is sufficient to call to mind such concepts as democracy, freedom, right, law.«<sup>56</sup>

In the period between 1933 and 1945, fundamentally different values were assigned to the concept of »Europe«, which comes as no surprise. Thus in writings from this period, from a decidedly »post-« and anti-democratic perspective, the »European values« were reinvented, or else *völkisch*-nationalist patterns of interpretation from the period before 1933 were updated.

Community and »public spirit« instead of individualism, »self-interest« and egoistical »cult of the ego«<sup>57</sup> are probably the first to come to mind. Secondly, it is striking that values such as »freedom« are not simply replaced by authoritarian values; rather, »freedom« is given a different meaning, over and above *individual*

freedom. The term is reinterpreted and re-evaluated in terms of a »community of the free« and a community of peoples and states striving for freedom. With the great European »fateful struggle« that begins in 1939, the free nations of the Continent who opted »for a freedom of discipline and order« are »brought into the arena«.<sup>58</sup> In the new European context, »freedom« means above all: liberation from »alien« influences and thus liberation from England and an Anglo-American culture that »undermined values«. The influence and »overpowering force« of the West were replaced by the cultural and political »self-determination« of Continental Europe.

Furthermore it should be stated in connection with the »canon of values« of the »New Europe« that before 1945 the expression »common European roots« is understood to mean something different than it does after World War Two. Thus in addition to the Graeco-Roman heritage, the expression also refers to a common *Indo-Germanic* heritage. Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann speaks of »inexhaustible Indo-Germanic and Aryan depths that nourish the European peoples today as they did in former times«.<sup>59</sup> The antithesis to these »depths« is American »superficiality«. The cultural *coherence* of Europe takes shape by differentiating itself from the »shallow pseudo-culture« of the West.

Naturally the list could go on, and one more important »fundamental value« of the »New Europe« should be mentioned and added here. Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann in his programmatic essay »Die geistige Gemeinsamkeit Europas« (The spiritual community of Europe) speaks, among other things, of the »will to autochthony« that unites the peoples of Europe.<sup>60</sup> A European, he says, is down-to-earth, and has close ties to his home region and to nature. Giseler Wirsing writes: »The European goes hiking like the German, or he lives in his landscape like the Italian and the Frenchman and is unhappy when he is prevented from doing so.«<sup>61</sup> In this case as well, »America« is used as a negative foil. »The American«, says Wirsing, »is a city dweller; he is one even when he lives in the country«, and, Wirsing adds, »the American's relationship to nature is soulless.«<sup>62</sup> Generally the values of the »New Europe« are formulated far more sharply in distinction to America than to Russia, since the distinction from Bolshevism and the Soviet Union »is self-evident« or at least does not have to be fully substantiated.<sup>63</sup>

The historian Ernest Gellner once wrote, in reference to the formation of nation states in the 19th century: »Nationalism was there first; it was the latter that would engender the nation – and not the other way around.«<sup>64</sup> In 21st century terms, we could say: Europeanism was there first; it was the latter that would engender Europe – and not the other way around.

Meanwhile it remains questionable whether Europe is actually being engendered. For historian Hayden White, Europe exists only in the discourse about Europe. In his reflections on the »European discourse«, or rather on »Europe as discourse«, White points out that like a fashion design Europe is constantly being reinvented: after 1945 or, respectively, in 1957 (founding of the EEC) as a creation from Paris, Bonn and Brussels and, before 1945, as a »vision« from National Socialist Berlin. »Europe«, says White, is a brand, a »fashion brand«, and a successful »fashion design«, exactly like the creations of Chanel and Dior. By analogy with Chanel's best-selling »classic little red jacket«, take, in the case of Europe – instead of »classic-ness«, »little-ness«, »red-ness« and »jacket-ness« – »freedom« and »democracy« plus a few other ingredients, and – hey presto – you've got the product »value-oriented Europe«.<sup>65</sup>

Europe, like the luxury brands of the fashion world, defines itself as that which is »noble«<sup>66</sup> and »good«, and thus sets itself apart not only from the less good and noble dictatorships and authoritarian regimes of the modern world, but also from its own imperialist and totalitarian past. This past becomes a *footnote* in the history of the successful »Project Europe«. Of the 16 contributions in the volume *Die kulturellen Werte Europas* published by Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt, only one, which has the somewhat unfortunately chosen and at the same time significant title »Der dunkle Kontinent« (The dark continent), explicitly deals with National Socialism and Stalinism.<sup>67</sup> Dictatorship in Europe is regarded as a special case, an accident.

Europe takes its shape *not* in the context of some *real* »history project« nourished, depending on its location, by Christian, Germanic, Greek and other roots, but *in discourse* about the putative project. It is the discourse that supports the effectiveness of the putative project idea in each case, towards the realisation of a totalitarian or a liberal Europe, as the case may be.

The difference between what is noble and what is not quite as noble has been described time and time again by critical historians from a number of viewpoints. In 2009, Kiran Klaus Patel and Veronika Lipphardt, for instance, compare the sublime self-image of the Europeans with the trail of blood they've left behind all over the world since the beginning of colonialisation. Commenting on a 2001 survey of »Europeans«, they write in connection with the brochure published by the EU, *How Europeans see themselves*:

»[...] Europeans were characterised [in the opinion of those interviewed, C.W.] by a series of typical features. According to the survey one of the foremost ›values of the Europeans‹ was ›helping others‹. One almost seems to hear a late echo of Heinrich Mann, who begins an essay written in 1916, titled ›Der Europäer‹ (The European), as follows: ›His spirit carries all seeds within it, but is characterised by reason and industriousness. We love moderation and usefulness. Faced with a choice between a self-destructive ecstatic and a saint who wants to help others, the one we perceive to be European is not the ecstatic but the helper‹. Not everyone always had as positive an opinion of Europeans, however, as Charles Darwin makes clear: ›Wherever the European has trod, death seems to pursue the aboriginal.‹<sup>68</sup>

What constitutes Europe and Europeans is still »controversial«. <sup>69</sup> For Heinrich Mann at any rate the project that was later called »Project Europe« was a project of helpers, of reason, unity and peace. In 1924 he published his essay »Vereinigte Staaten von Europa« (United States of Europe), in which he emphasises that »we Europeans tend to see what we have in common« rather than what separates us.<sup>70</sup> And in the essay mentioned by Patel and Lipphardt, »Der Europäer«, he writes that now that »freedom and self-determination« have already been achieved, the next steps for Europeans are »unity and inner *peace*«. <sup>71</sup> Heinrich Mann writes this sentence in 1916, at the height of World War One, and 100 years later, at the beginning of the 21st century and before the start of the Ukraine crisis, his words almost did come true. The European project was referred to as a project of peace. However, can we seriously call Mann's words »prophetic« and view Heinrich Mann as the trailblazer of a European peace project? Actually, only if we are prepared to blank out and ignore the period between 1933 and 1989, the Nazi period, World War Two and the period of the Cold War. The road to »inner peace« in Europe was not mapped out in advance and Heinrich Mann was not its trailblazer. The idea of European peace – once launched by Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand and Stresemann – »is implemented«, according to the great European narrative, after 1945 on the basis of German-French friendship in the EEC and the European

Community. However, on closer examination the German-French friendship turns out to be a West German-French friendship, and the idea of European peace is also a West German-French and anything but a pan-European idea.<sup>72</sup> Founded in 1957, the EEC is a product of the Cold War and »Europe« is a project directed against the communist East and die Soviet Union. What is more, the EEC was founded after previously, in 1954, the attempt to create a European *defence* community had failed because of the opposition of the French government.

To speak of Europe as a peace project and a project of unity and gradual growing together has the character of a phantasmagoric entelechy: coming out of war and turmoil, overcoming limitations and differences, everything turns out well in the end. And even if everything does not turn out well and Europe drifts apart during a »steadily ongoing process of integration«, a new explanatory model will surely be found within the framework of a new grand narrative to describe the serious differences that have existed *from the outset* among European nations, and that would inevitably and inescapably have led to the breaking apart of the European Union. No question. The important thing is that Europe is completely redesigned from time to time and like a *passe-partout* can be filled by its designers with ever new and different content which *changes* as needed.

If we assume that there is a »Project of the West«<sup>73</sup>, then there was once also a »Project of the Centre«<sup>74</sup>, or rather of Central Europe, shaped by German-Italian totalitarianism. (In the »age of the Axis powers«, besides Germany, Central Europe also included Italy.) Christoph Steding describes this project in 1938 in his book *Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur* (The Reich and the Disease of European Culture) in the jargon of the Nazi period and in categories borrowed from medicine.<sup>75</sup> Europe, according to his »findings«, was infected by sick ideas such as rationalism, individualism and nihilism etc.; in the meantime, however, it is on the road to recovery, and in the course of this process of healing the convalescent will gradually recover his former strength and overcome the morbid excesses of the modern era.

Steding's reasoning has a number of features that are characteristic of a teleological approach to history.

1. There is a predetermined goal, and the road to it is long and arduous, involving many setbacks.
2. Setbacks and defeats, however, are followed by partial victories of a far broader scope. For instance, for Christoph Steding the »wars of unification« between 1864 and 1871 were milestones on the road of »recovery« and »renewal«. <sup>76</sup>
3. However, not all countries set out on the road to renewal at the same time and in equal measure. Some dash ahead, and others lag behind. In democratic Scandinavia, for instance, there are occasional »delays« (just as after 1945, in Spain and Portugal, which are still governed autocratically, »deviations« from the »Project of the West« can be observed). <sup>77</sup>
4. Ultimately, however, the spark leaps the gap. In Christoph Steding's model of history: from Germany and Italy to the remaining countries of Europe – and in the opposite direction after 1945, one might add: from Great Britain and France to a Germany that has strayed from the European path of democracy and then becomes an integral part of the *West* once the Federal Republic is founded.

On the other hand, for Steding, in the course of the European process of recovery and renewal, Germany in 1938 again moved back into the *middle* of the continent. Steding states:

»The Reich, which presently, as Europeans are convinced, is still located on the periphery if not outside of Europe – since ›Europe‹ is essentially still identical with ›Western Europe‹, the Europe of the League of Nations – is [...] in the *centre of Europe*.«<sup>78</sup>

Germany moves from the periphery into the centre. The idea of Europe is freed of Western influences and Europe is again defined from the centre. The balances and priorities shift, and not only with respect to the Western powers France and Great Britain, but also with respect to the South and Italy, which is counted as part of the centre. »The continental structure is emancipating itself« from its Mediterranean beginnings, and a new »spatial image of Europe«, open to the North, appears.<sup>79</sup> For F. A. Six, Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann and Walther Kiaulehn, Europe and Europeanness are not only Graeco-Roman but also Germanic-Nordic in origin. The European family tree created by Kiaulehn for his series of articles »Das bist Du, Europa« (That's You, Europe) (cf. the illustration on p. 27) »is rooted« not only in the Mediterranean region, but also in Central Europe. What began in the South does not become Pan-European until it »comes into contact with Germanness«, and not only the South but *the North* and *the Nordic as well* have a substantial share in shaping Europe. Here it is necessary to make a distinction between two closely adjoining sets and patterns of argumentation – (1) a diachronic and (2) a synchronic pattern – in the discourse about the origins and foundations of what is European. Comparable to the torch relay at the opening of the Olympic Games in Berlin, in the (1) diachronic model the »European torch« is handed by the Greeks to the Romans and by the Roman Caesars to the German emperors and finally to a Europe »growing« under Germanic influence.<sup>80</sup> In the (2) synchronic model favoured by Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, on the other hand, Europe is »fed« from the start and from time immemorial by three sources and »points of strength«, namely by »Greece and Rome *and* the ancient cradle of nations between the Middle Rhine and the Bug River«. <sup>81</sup>

The word »cradle« refers to the beginning and the beginnings of Europe, and the term »cradle of nations« (›Völkerwiege‹) refers to the »ancient« »*völkisch* reserve«<sup>82</sup> or more precisely the »high-quality race« that *embodies* the idea of Europe and is *destined* to make this idea a reality. And indeed, or at least so it seems in retrospect, the »cradle of nations« situated between the River Rhine and the Bug River in the centre of Europe, which »coincidentally« comprises the very territory that is now called the »Greater German Reich«, evolves in the 20th century to become a leading power that forcibly unites the countries of the Continent – a power that, from Eschmann's perspective, serves a higher European mission.

The increase in value of the centre and of Central Europe means primarily an increase in value of the German Reich as Europe's centre of power and control. From now on it was in the centre of the continent that the currents of power converged, and it was from here that everything was to be controlled and steered in future. Germany was not only the centre, the heart of Europe, but also, as it says in an article dated 1941, Europe's »homeland«, in which the idea of Europe had always had its home and put down its deepest roots.<sup>83</sup>

This monograph is titled »*Das Neue Europa*« 1933–1945. *German Thought Patterns about Europe*. While the investigation *period* is thus exactly defined, the *object* of the investigation is not. It is described below in more detail. In general it was necessary to make choices. (1) Which authors and (2) what types of texts should be the focus of the investigation?

As for the authors: During initial research in connection with this book, a group of persons and authors gradually began to crystallise, characterised by several common traits. What was most striking was the fact that the publications of the authors in question from the period between 1933 and 1945 clearly *related to Europe*. Specifically the study covers a total of eight authors – Margret Boveri, Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, Gustav R. Hocke, Walther Kiaulehn, Karl Korn, Friedrich Sieburg, Egon Vietta and Giseller Wirsing. These authors cover a »terrain« or area that is by no means hermetically sealed off against the wider environment, and thus »close« and somewhat more »distant« relatives such as Max Clauss and Colin Ross, who have already been mentioned, are also discussed at least marginally. The transitions are fluid, and the context of the study is capable of expansion.

An additional shared characteristic of the above authors is that after 1933 they remained in the German Reich, were active as journalists and writers and intermittently, e.g., as foreign correspondents, spent time in other European countries, or travelled abroad extensively, or dealt with »foreign matters« while based in the Reich. They all published prolifically, and their publications, to a large extent, were able to appear unhindered, in part with the support of important agencies of the Nazi regime. Because they address matters international and European, the texts of the above-named authors constitute a specific publishing sector in the literary and journalistic field of the period between 1933 and 1945 that is the subject of investigation of this study.

The publications that are described here in greater detail include various types of texts. They range from newspaper articles to essays to monographs and travelogues. The eight authors were journalists, columnists, essayists as well as authors of books of non-fiction, and some of them had published works of fiction. They wrote for the big daily papers, the weekly paper *Das Reich*, and periodicals such as *Signal* and *Die Tat* or, respectively, for *Das XX. Jahrhundert*, the successor periodical to *Die Tat*. *Das Reich*, *Signal* and *Das XX. Jahrhundert* were »organs« of the discourse on Europe and were systematically examined and analysed for the present monograph so as to be able to look at the articles of the eight authors in the context of their journalistic setting.

The journalistic discourse, like the decidedly propagandistic discourse on Europe, is different from the political discourse of the National Socialist leadership – presumably there may not even be such a thing as political discourse on Europe by the Nazi leadership. For from the beginning to the end in 1945, Europe in this discourse was completely overshadowed by »magnitudes« that had evolved historically, such as the »Reich«, or new constructions like »Greater Germany« or the »Greater Germanic Empire of the German Nation«. »The ›Reich‹ preced[ed] the concept of Europe«, and Hitler regarded not only the Slavic, but also the Latin peoples as »belonging to an alien race«, writes historian Paul Kluge in a highly publicised essay immediately after World War Two.<sup>84</sup> Entering a supranational community, for instance with the French, was unthinkable. Europe as a federation of independent countries did not play a serious role in National Socialist plans for a new order for the period after World War Two.<sup>85</sup>

The propaganda, on the other hand, presents a different picture. Here, particularly after the attack on the Soviet Union and especially after the lost battle of Stalingrad, the common struggle of the »Europeans« against Bolshevism moves into the foreground,<sup>86</sup> and the »international magazine« *Signal*, which is published in several languages, is developed into the journalistic bastion of a European community that »struggles for survival«. Rightly, Rainer Rutz, who has

done research on *Signal*, emphasises that the magazine was given »that European touch« long before Giselher Wirsing [1943–45, C.W.] became its editor and »made the periodical the most popular and effective German medium abroad«. <sup>87</sup> Rutz concludes that the motto »New Europe«, which runs like a red thread through the present study, was proclaimed by the periodical *Signal* as early as August 1940. <sup>88</sup> In the 1930s it could already be found in the newspapers and other publications of the Third Reich. The year 1941 marks the publication of a book titled *Das neue Europa* <sup>89</sup> and, at the same time, of the first issue of the periodical *Das neue Europa. Kampfschrift gegen das englisch-amerikanische Welt- und Geschichtsbild*. <sup>90</sup> The term had caught on.

### Authors, texts and contexts

This study is based on the texts of the above-named eight authors. However, texts are part of contexts. Following are a few particulars and comments that contextualise the texts with regard to the period, other works, and persons.

To begin with Giselher Wirsing: In the early 1930s, Wirsing (1907–1975), together with his »friend« Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann <sup>91</sup>, was one of the leading representatives of the »conservative-revolutionary« *Tat* circle. After 1933 (until 1939), he succeeds Hans Zehrer as the editor of the monthly magazine *Die Tat*. <sup>92</sup>

In 1934 Wirsing is promoted to department head and later to executive editor of *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* and in 1939, together with Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, becomes the editor of the periodical *Das XX. Jahrhundert*, the successor periodical to *Tat*. In 1943 he becomes (at first unofficially <sup>93</sup>) the editorial director of the international magazine *Signal*. Of the eight authors, Wirsing is presumably closest to the Party and the state apparatus. He has already been collaborating with the SS, according to his »own statements« »since the autumn of 1932«, then officially joins the »Schutzstaffel« in 1938, and in 1942, as a Sturm-bannführer, writes a «memorandum« on Russia of which Joseph Goebbels says that it is »extraordinarily cleverly and skilfully composed«. <sup>94</sup>

During the Nazi period, Giselher Wirsing comes to public attention primarily as the author of numerous publications about »enemy foreign countries« and also makes a name for himself by writing »diagnoses of the times«. Just before the end of the war, in 1944, he publishes a book about the new »age of Icarus« and, under the pseudonym Vindex, a pamphlet against »Soviet imperialism«. <sup>95</sup>

After World War Two, from 1954 to 1970, Wirsing is the editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper *Christ und Welt*.

Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann (1904–1987) is regarded by the »conservative revolutionary« Armin Mohler as »the most important talent« of the *Tat* circle. <sup>96</sup> At the very least, Eschmann is a contemporary who had many different talents and varied interests. He is a social scientist <sup>97</sup> who is interested in politics, ancient cultures and religions, writes philosophical aphorisms (e.g., *Aus dem Punktbuch*, 1944) and at the same time is open to modernity and opposes the anti-technological spirit of the time, for instance, by singing a paean to power stations in Wirsing's *Christ und Welt* in the 1950s. <sup>98</sup>

The main geographic-historical points of reference in Eschmann's work, in addition to the »Reich«, are Italy and France. He publishes several papers on fascism in Italy, and the title of his unfinished magnum opus in 1943 is *Die Führungsschichten in Frankreich*. Eschmann writes this book at the *Deutsches Aus-*

*landswissenschaftliches Institut (DAWI)*, founded in 1940 in Berlin and headed by Franz Alfred Six, where he works as a professor. <sup>99</sup>

After 1945 Eschmann lives in Switzerland as a freelance writer, and between 1960 and 1969 he teaches at Münster University as a professor of sociology.

Even more than in the work of Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, the geographic-historical point of reference in the case of Egon Vietta (1903–1959) is Italy and Italianità. Vietta has been a government official in Karlsruhe since the mid-1930s; at the same time he publishes essays in the periodical *Die Literatur* and in 1943 becomes the »executive editor« of the monthly magazine *Italien* that was founded a year earlier. In 1938 he is dismissed from the Baden civil service and moves to Stade near Hamburg. <sup>100</sup>

The literary historian Gregor Streim interprets the articles written for the periodical *Die Literatur* and the monthly magazine *Italien* in connection with the so-called »third humanism«. And rightly so, although Streim also has to concede that »Vietta does not adopt the term »third humanism««. <sup>101</sup> The third humanism sees itself as the successor of classical humanism and of the humanism of the Renaissance, and (again on the basis of its own understanding of itself) is a practical and realistic humanism of »action«, over and above the antiquated humanism taught in secondary schools.

Among the most important representatives of the third humanism in the 1930s and 1940s are the Italian Minister of Education Giuseppe Bottai and the philosopher Ernesto Grassi. At the official opening of the institute *Studia Humanitatis*, on 7 December 1942 in Berlin, Grassi declares:

»The *Studia Humanitatis* have from the beginning been associated with an ideal type of human being whose focus does not lie in abstract contemplation and sterile seclusion from the world, but in creative action.« <sup>102</sup>

In addition to Ernesto Grassi, Giuseppe Bottai also speaks at the institute's opening ceremony. In the previous years Bottai was not only a minister, but had also participated in the so-called »Abyssinian campaign« and published a number of books. He wrote the books *Die Verteidigung des Humanismus*, and *Afrikanisches Tagebuch*, about his participation in the »Abyssinian campaign«. Two reviews by Vietta of *Die Verteidigung des Humanismus* appeared in the press, <sup>103</sup> one in March 1942 in the periodical *Italien* and the other, in which the author also mentions the *Afrikanisches Tagebuch*, in September 1941 in the *Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt*. To begin with the March 1942 review: in it, Egon Vietta pursues a double-pronged argumentative strategy that revolves around the concepts of vitality, intellect and intellectuality. On the one hand he describes Bottai as the spokesman of a »new intellectual vitality that is a match for real life, and on the other he speaks of the fact that Bottai is concerned with »restoring the dominion of the intellect« and »dominion« over »vitalistic instincts«. <sup>104</sup> The Vietta scholar Gregor Streim aptly comments on this line of reasoning as follows:

»Clearly recognisable here is a *double dissociation* from bourgeois-liberal humanism on the one hand and vitalistic anti-intellectualism on the other hand [...].« <sup>105</sup>

In the other review, which appeared in the *Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt*, on the other hand, there is no question of a double dissociation, or an argumentation strategy characterised by ambivalences. It appears to be an almost unrestrained hymn of praise to »active life« and to a »modern age aglow with activity«. <sup>106</sup> According to Vietta, Bottai is a »man of action and soldier who takes his place in the intellectual tradition of his native soil«. <sup>107</sup> Naturally at this point one wonders how the significant differences between the two reviews can be explained. What was the »true« and »actual position« of the author »behind his texts«? However,

questions like these, with which one ventures into speculation, must remain open here.

It is the texts that are the subject of this study. And in the chapters that follow, four of the over 20 books written by Vietta will be addressed.

After World War Two, Vietta moves to Darmstadt. As the critic of the West German cultural sector, he publishes the book *Katastrophe oder Wende des deutschen Theaters* (1955) and becomes one of the organisers of the »Darmstadt Dialogues«.

Like Egon Vietta, Gustav R. Hocke (1908–1984) is also an admirer of Italianità. Starting in 1934, Hocke works and writes for the *Kölnische Zeitung* and becomes the editor of the Sunday supplement »Geist der Gegenwart« (Spirit of the Present). In 1937 he first takes a trip to Italy, which leads to his writing the book *Das verschwundene Gesicht* in 1939. In 1940 Hocke returns to Italy, or Rome to be precise, as the foreign correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, working there as a journalist until 1943.

During this period, the Italianità admired by Hocke is fascist in character, and this leaves a clear mark in his literary and journalistic texts. Below is a sample from an article about Sicily that appears in 1942 in the *Kölnische Zeitung*:

»We [i.e., the author and a Sicilian landowner, C.W.] left the hotel together, ate together (we had those delicious Mediterranean fish of this region, which are admittedly becoming rare because fishing has been restricted), and then separated with the greeting »Vincere«, which has become a custom, the word with which Mussolini concluded his speech announcing Italy's entry into the war on 10 June 1940. This word appears everywhere on envelopes and letterheads, in trams, on cinema screens, in restaurants, on children's toys and on the walls of houses. Even the smallest supplier stamps his clumsily written bill with this call: »Victory« [...].«<sup>108</sup>

Aesthetics, enjoyment of life and politics are deeply intertwined in Hocke's texts. The noble and rare fish and a noble fascism that has inherited the legacy of antiquity go together and are mentioned in the same breath. National Socialism, which is not quite as noble, on the other hand, hardly ever gets a mention in Hocke's work. Nor does it play a particularly important role in his newspaper articles or in his other texts.

After the retreat of the German army and the U.S. troops' entry into Rome, Hocke becomes an Allied prisoner of war and, deported to America, briefly publishes the periodical *Der Ruf* in 1945/46. In 1946 he returns to Germany and, in 1949, to Italy, where he writes his main works, the books *Die Welt als Labyrinth* and *Manierismus in der Literatur*.

All his life, like Hocke, Friedrich Sieburg (1893–1964) was also fond of the Latin, in this case, the French, way of life – and this in spite of all the harsh and »unsparing« criticism of neighbouring France during the Nazi period. The year 1929 marks the publication of his book *Gott in Frankreich?*, which was to make him famous overnight. Further »country monographs« about Poland, Portugal, Japan and French North Africa follow in the 1930s. From 1926 until 1930 he is the foreign correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in Paris, from 1930 until 1932 in the same capacity in London and from 1932 until 1939 in Paris once more. In 1939 he joins the foreign service, spends the early 1940s in France and finally, in 1942/43, again reports for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.<sup>109</sup>

In his books, unlike in his articles about daily political events, Sieburg often formulates his position on France and French culture far less harshly and drastically, but rather multivalently and paradoxically. This is confirmed, among oth-

ers, by the beginning sentences of his book *Gott in Frankreich?* (which in the later versions of 1935 and 1940 remain unaltered). In answer to the question »Why I write about France«, the author says among other things: »because I give preference to the progress of ideas as opposed to the idea of progress« and »because there needs to be a country in the world that [...] is a solid bulwark against the perfection of humanity«. <sup>110</sup>

Sieburg's person and work have remained very controversial to this day. Judgements range from the »mediator between cultures« who contributed significantly to the »demobilisation« of prevailing stereotypes of the enemy«, to the verdict that »Sieburg's pen was in the service of power«. <sup>111</sup>

The unambiguously positive or, as the case may be, negative opinions about the author are in marked contrast to Sieburg's writings, which often »lack« unambiguously. In many cases the seemingly inherent underlying tendency of a number of his texts is contradicted by a countertendency. In general it can be said that Sieburg regards France as a backward country – but what does that mean? After all, a backward country can be viewed from very different perspectives. As one of the many reasons »why« he »writes about France«, Sieburg mentions the following:

»[...] because it is good, indeed necessary, to ponder for a while and let your heart grow heavy at the sight of France as it falls behind, before the voyage into the new age begins [...].«<sup>112</sup>

France, which »refuses to join the industrial modern age, and insists on its way of life« serves Sieburg to »articulate« his »own uneasiness« with a world that is rapidly and fundamentally changing.<sup>113</sup> This uneasiness is also articulated in his book *Blick durchs Fenster. Aus zehn Jahren Frankreich und England*. When the master chef Escoffier dies in 1939, Sieburg, who considers himself a »connoisseur« and not a »consumer«, writes an obituary to the inventor of Peach Melba in *Blick durchs Fenster* in which he says:

»The spoon has slipped from his fine hand. The spoon is not a tool of our time. Younger and lively hands reach for the hammer, the sword and other implements of the harsh present.«<sup>114</sup>

The »spoon«, »fine« and »refinement« are at odds with the modern age and seem almost anachronistic. Yet nothing that is significantly better is taking their place. Rather, the *soft* peach is replaced by something *harsh*, enjoyment is replaced by action, and the good old traditions that have become outmoded are inexorably followed by the »bad new« ones – which, however, must be accepted and, since they are unstoppable anyhow, must also be legitimised and defended. After the war Sieburg is at first banned from publishing, and then, in 1948, joins the staff and in 1949 becomes co-editor of the periodical *Die Gegenwart*, and from 1956 until his death, in 1964, works as a literary critic for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Like Sieburg, his later colleague at FAZ, Karl Korn (1908–1991) too spends the early 1930s in France. From 1932 until 1934 he works as a lecturer in Toulouse. Later, after his return to Germany, he becomes a newspaper editor, at first, from 1934 until 1937, for the *Berliner Tageblatt*, then, from 1937 until 1940, for the *Neue Rundschau* and finally, in 1940/41, for the weekly *Das Reich*. During his time at *Das Reich* he writes several articles about France, which has by then been occupied, and in 1940, according to Armin Mohler, publishes under the pseudonym Edmund Halm a brochure titled *Die Alliance française*, subtitled *Weltbund des französischen Kulturimperialismus* (world alliance of French cultural imperialism).<sup>115</sup> Although Korn writes pro-regime reviews of the propaganda film *Jud Süß* for *Das Reich*, he falls out of favour with the Nazi leadership because of an-

other, »not quite as correct« review of an art exhibition, and in 1941 »at the command of the Führer« is barred from the *Reich*.<sup>116</sup>

After the war Korn is one of the spokespeople of conservative cultural critique,<sup>117</sup> founds the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) in 1949 together with other publicists and becomes its feature page editor. Until 1973 he is a member of the board of publishers of the FAZ.<sup>118</sup>

From the beginning, the journalist Margret Boveri has much in common with Karl Korn. Both begin working for the *Berliner Tageblatt* at the same time, in 1934, and like Korn Boveri also remains on its staff until 1937. It is during this period that, following several trips through Southern Europe and North Africa, she writes her book *Weltgeschehen am Mittelmeer*, which appears in 1936. In 1938/39 she publishes two more books: *Vom Minarett zum Bohrturm* and *Ein Auto, Wüsten, blaue Perlen*. In both books she describes her impressions and experiences during a journey she took earlier through the Near East on behalf of the publishing company Atlantis (Zurich) and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. After 1939 Boveri works as a foreign correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, at first in Stockholm, later in New York and finally in Lisbon. After the *Frankfurter Zeitung* has to stop publishing in 1943, as the *Berliner Tageblatt* had already done earlier, Boveri joins the staff of the weekly *Das Reich*. She spends the last months of the war in Berlin.

After World War Two she takes a stand against the division of Germany and against the newly founded Federal Republic's integration in the West, writes a small, controversial *Amerika-Fibel* in 1946, and in 1956–1960 writes her four-volume magnum opus *Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert*.

In 1947 Boveri states that »except for one article« she stands by »all her publications »before and after 1933«.<sup>119</sup> By this »one article« she probably means »Landschaft mit doppeltem Boden. Einfluß und Tarnung des amerikanischen Judentums« (Landscape with double standards. The influence and camouflage of American Jewry), which appears on May 28 and 29, 1943 in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. The text in question includes an article that is both anti-Semitic and anti-American – and an article about anti-Semitism in America. The report is written from two perspectives: (1) from the perspective of an American cleaning lady and (2) from the perspective of a newcomer to New York. The cleaning lady complains that »one« can »no longer live« in the neighbourhood near Riverside Drive, »for it has been invaded by the Jews« who have »ruined« the neighbourhood. The newcomer describes the day on which the Jewish New Year is celebrated by saying:

»The Jews who went to their synagogues on this day are roughly speaking part of a large group of the unassimilated. In a landscape of business morals where outsmarting your partner is one of the things that is taken for granted, where people unscrupulously sell spoiled groceries and openly boast about a successful swindle, they play a role that produces strong unexpressed hatred.«<sup>120</sup>

To this day it has not been established beyond all possible doubt which sections of the article about »American Jewry« were penned by Boveri and which were not. It is certain, however, that Boveri's article was »reworked« by the editorial staff of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.<sup>121</sup> That much is clear. But it is also clear, and Margret Boveri also realised this in hindsight, that »in those times«, in the year 1943, the »subject« of Jews in America »should not have been touched at all«.<sup>122</sup>

Boveri's May 1943 newspaper article is one of those articles from the Nazi period that are incomprehensible and that cannot be interpreted and classified without knowing the context in which they were created.


The »subject« of Jews – this time not in America, but in France – is also »touched upon« by another of the eight authors – Walther Kiaulehn (1900–1968). And in this case as well it is important to know the context. Kiaulehn begins his journalistic career in 1924 with the *Berliner Abendblatt*. In 1930 he switches to *B.Z. am Mittag*, published by Ullstein-Verlag, and works there until 1933. During World War Two he is one of the »busiest contributors« of the periodical *Signal*<sup>123</sup> and in 1943 writes an article for the latter about the deportation of the Jews from Marseille that is distinctly anti-Semitic in tone (see pp. 58–61). In addition to the »textual witnesses« that reveal Kiaulehn as an anti-Semite, there are admittedly contemporary human witnesses as well who describe him as a person who resolutely opposed anti-Semitism. When in 1933 Nazi supporters march through the Ullstein building shouting the slogan »Jews out!« he is said to have »called out to them: »[...] for years you've been taking the Jews' money, and now you want to drive them out of the house [...]«.<sup>124</sup>

At this point, without further comment, this study can merely refer to this blatant contradiction between the 1943 text and the witness' statement from 1933.

After World War Two Walther Kiaulehn makes his appearance as a theatre and culture critic and in 1950 becomes the feature page editor of the *Münchener Merkur*.

### »That's You, Europe«

»That's You, Europe« is the title of a series of articles by Walther Kiaulehn that appeared in Issues 11, 12 and 13 of the periodical *Signal* in 1944. The series consists of three parts: (1) »Up to the Renaissance« (Issue 11, pp. 23–26 and pp. 30



1. »An outline of the historico-cultural evolution of Europe«. The European family tree, illustration for Walther Kiaulehn's article »Das bist Du, Europa«, in: *Signal*, no. 11, 1944, pp. 20 f.

to 31), (2) »Up to the permanent revolution« (no. 12, pp. 23–25, p. 30 and pp. 36–37) and (3) »The road to socialism« (no. 13, pp. 23–26, p. 30 and p. 34).

»Permanent revolution« here refers to the constant renewal of the Continent and the struggle against anti- and extra-European powers, while »Socialism« refers to German-type National Socialism. The first part of the series of articles is preceded by a short introduction that basically consists of a highly schematised map (see illustration), and to which a few explanations of the pictograms used have also been added [pp. 20f.].

Before we address this topic in more detail, here is a short comment on the pictures also included in the three articles. Between the introduction and Part I there is the photograph of a Corinthian column »illuminated by the blue sky« of Greece, »the homeland of European culture«. <sup>125</sup> The Corinthian column is followed by depictions of the »fathers of the European spirit« – Archimedes, Euclid, Plato, Hippocrates, etc. – and the Father of all Fathers and »epitome of European greatness«: Emperor Charlemagne. <sup>126</sup> All this is hardly surprising.



After this, however, there is a break – or a remarkable symbiosis of past and present. Charlemagne is followed by two young, lascivious-looking women with sophisticated hats and lacquered nails, holding cocktail glasses, who in turn are followed on the next page by two more women of the wholesome »German maiden type«. <sup>127</sup> Both depictions of women are in striking contrast to the »terracotta figurine from ancient Greece also depicted here. The little terracotta figure also represents a woman, and the caption says: »Fashion 2200 years ago.« <sup>128</sup> »In the decorative figurines«, says the caption, »the symmetry of great Greek art« is joined »with the individual taste and personal charm of the ladies portrayed to create delightful unity. Thus familiar European people and ideals greet us over the millennia.« <sup>129</sup>

At first glance the young women depicted here have no recognisable connection with the great men of Europe shown previously. The pictures are obviously supposed to speak for themselves. They refer to the Graeco-Germanic ideal of beauty, which has female connotations, as a counterpart to the masculine ideal of intellectual and historical greatness *and* they inseparably connect »Greekness« and »Germanness« over the millennia – from Archimedes by way of Charlemagne all the way to the modern, cheerful 20th-century European women. While these connections are not explicitly named in Part II of the series of articles, Part III concludes by saying: »Power and beauty are our [i.e., our European, C.W.] symbols.« <sup>130</sup>

Part II of the series, after showing two »spirited horses« at the beginning, completely reflects the Axis powers Germany and Italy. It includes portraits and self-portraits of Leonardo da Vinci and Albrecht Dürer as well as a detail of Botticelli's Allegory of Spring (a woman adorned with flowers) and Domenico Veneziano's portrait of a young Italian woman. In Part II of the series as well (1) Europe's North corresponds to the Mediterranean South and (2) the gravity of masculine creative work with the lightness of feminine grace: (1) Dürer »lends Central European profundity« to the Renaissance, and (2) Botticelli's flower-garlanded woman is celebrated as a »hymn to life«. <sup>131</sup>

Part III of the series of articles contains six, or rather seven, short profiles and pictures of great European men of the present, who are assigned concise keywords: »The Motor« – »The Heart« – »The Energy« – »The Telegram« – »Blessing of the Earth« and »Philosophy«. Depicted are: the German engineer and technician Rudolf Diesel (»The Motor«), the French surgeon Alexis Carrel (»The

2. »The Physician Hippocrates« – »originator of the inductive observational medical method«, from: Walther Kiaulehn, »Das bist Du, Europa«, in: *Signal*, no. 11, 1944, n.p. [p. 24].  
3. »The Heart« – the Nobel Prize winner and cardiac surgeon Alexis Carrel, author of the book *Der Mensch, das unbekannte Wesen* – »a gift of the European spirit to the world«, from: Walther Kiaulehn, »Das bist Du, Europa«, in: *Signal*, no. 13, 1944, p. 25. In Kiaulehn's constructs of Europeanness, »new« genealogies are created, for instance, in European medical history. In his 1944 article the development ranges from Hippocrates to Alexis Carrel, who was not only a cardiac surgeon, but also a leading representative of »modern« eugenics. In the chapter »Einen neuen Menschen schaffen«, Carrel writes in his book *Der Mensch, das unbekannte Wesen*: »In Germany the government has taken energetic measures against the reproduction of inferior human beings, of the mentally and of criminals. The ideal solution would be to eradicate every individual of this type [...]«. From: Alexis Carrel, *Der Mensch, das unbekannte Wesen*, Stuttgart, n.d. [1936], p. 318. The passage quoted here was included as it stands in the new edition of the book after World War Two, Stuttgart 1950, p. 421.



Heart«), <sup>132</sup> the German physicist Max Planck (»The Energy«), the Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi (»The Telegram«), the Norwegian writer Knut Hamsun (»Blessing of the Earth«) and the Spanish »thinker« Ortega y Gasset (»Philosophy«). <sup>133</sup> A somewhat larger photograph, under the motto »Iron instead of stones«, is then added on the next page, showing the Frenchman Gustave Eiffel. These seven pictures in the last article of the series »That's You, Europe« correspond strikingly to the six profiles of the »ancient Greeks« in the first article of Kiaulehn's series. Obviously we are intended to see a connection between the beginnings of Europe in antiquity and the peak of the unfolding of »European intellectual powers« in the present.

The arrangement of the pictures is striking as well: At the top of the page, parallel next to each other, are ranked on the one hand the representatives of what would later be called the »exact sciences«, Archimedes and Euclid, and on the other hand the mechanical engineer Rudolf Diesel and the »breeder of men« Carrel. However, the »poets and thinkers« of the past and present – Homer and Sophocles or, respectively, Hamsun and Ortega y Gasset – only appear in the »lower ranks«, that is to say, in the lower third of the page. In Kiaulehn's article, the importance of philosophy and literature is reduced, while the value of the exact sciences is upgraded. This may have to do, firstly, with the re-evaluation of all values that is taking place in the Third Reich, but secondly also with Kiaulehn's personal preference for all things technical. The six profiles of the great Europeans of the present are embedded in the third article in a subchapter titled »Machines as power«. This heading is a variant of »The birth, history and power of machines«, the subtitle of Kiaulehn's book *Die eisernen Engel*, several excerpts from which are quoted in the *Signal* article. Among other things Kiaulehn quotes a passage that explicitly refers to the power of machines. In a reenactment, an intimate of James Watt says to King George that the world will be ruled only by those men who have the »power« [= might *and* force, C.W.] of machines at their command. <sup>134</sup>

Yet machines and other technical artefacts are fascinating not only because they give power, but also because they are beautiful. In technical artefacts, power and beauty are manifested as the quintessence of Europe. That is made clear both in the *Signal* articles and in the newspaper report »Im Schnellboot« (»In the speedboat«), which Kiaulehn writes for *Das Reich* in 1940. The key message of his report about the life of speedboat men in the English Channel and the »meaning« of the technological revolution can best be expressed in the words of the author himself: »the ecstasy of speed«, combined with »nervous tension« and the »enhanced feeling of being alive« – »riding a speedboat is beautiful«. <sup>135</sup>

At the beginning and at the same time in the centre of Walther Kiaulehn's series of articles there is a highly schematic map, or rather a »cartographical interpretation« of the »development, achievements and spread of the culture of our continent« – at least according to the comments of the editors of the *Signal* on the schematic diagram. <sup>136</sup> Shown in the diagram is a family tree with a recognisably »European lineage« in the middle, from which individual branches point left into the »Western hemisphere« and right towards the East. In Kiaulehn's »cartographical interpretation« the family tree is rooted in Central Europe, or, to be more precise, in Northern Central Europe, and over and above that in Mediterranean antiquity as well, as indicated by a temple pictured *under* the family tree. Sustained by an advanced civilisation, seafaring and agriculture, Europe prospers and develops; and at the provisory end of this development, which is accompanied by undesirable developments, there appears at the top of the tree or